COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" As to a Change of Ministry, the change to answer any good purpose, must be *radical*; it must include " all; yea, underlings and all; there must be a clean sweeping out of all the dirt of twenty years collecting; " it must be such a change as will lead to, and very soon produce, a complete *change of system*, or I shall " have no hope in it." POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. IX. p. 95.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SWEEPING OF OFFICES.——The Courier newspaper, of the 6th instant, complains most bitterly of the " sweeping," down to the very clerks, which has taken place, in the public offices, in consequence of the change in the ministry; upon which the first observation to make is, that it is *false*. Very little sweeping has taken place; no clerks have been removed, that I have heard of; and, as to Under Secretaries, there certainly has not been sweeping enough. In truth, the fault is, that, in almost every department, there appears a disposition to retain as many as possible of the creatures of Mr. Pitt; and, in the Treasury Department, this disposition is evidently very strong indeed. We all know how much, when we come to the execution of an office, depends upon the secondary officers; and, therefore, it must be matter of concern with the friends of the new ministry, to see so many of these officers remain; and, further to see, that in the removals, care seems to have been taken to avoid, as much as possible, touching the close adherents of the late minister, whose *intentions*, as to appointments, have, it is said, as far as comes under one great officer of the new cabinet, been punctually fulfilled. I once observed, that, upon the grounds whereon the Pitts and Dundases had been supported, for many years past, I did not see why they might not bequeath us at their death! So far, then, from the Pitts having reason to complain of a sweeping disposition in the new ministry, it appears to me, that the public has a right to complain, that there has been nothing worthy of the name of sweeping taken place. Too many of the odious old names are continually occurring, as we read or talk of the offices of government. Old habits must still be indulged in. It is quite impossible, while we see these men in office, that we should believe, that such a change has taken place as we could have wished; or, which is worse, that such a change is intented to take place. Mr. Fox is, in the above-mentioned paper, most bitterly reproached with the changes that *he* has made in his office; and, after what has been said above, I have only to add, that the subject for regret is, that his example has not been more generally followed. There are, indeed, certain offices which, generally speaking, are, and ought to be considered as being too low to be liable to feel the effect of ministerial revolutions; yet, this must always be a matter to be left to the judgment of the superior officers; for, it not unfrequently happens, that an inferior officer has power to do great mischief; and, if he has been a devoted tool of the late minister, it is quite silly to hope for any change of that system from those by whom such tool is retained in office.

MINISTERIAL PROFESSIONS.——That, however, which has given the most alarm to all the real friends of the new ministry, is, the latitude, or supposed latitude, of their professions, now made in parliament, with regard to measures, which they have heretofore so decidedly condemned. Of the uses, which the friends and adherents of the Pitt system are making of these professions, a specimen offers itself in the following remarks from the Courier newspaper of the 3d. instant. " This reasoning" (meaning the reasoning contained in Mr. Fox's explanation, on the 17th ultimo, of what he had said, a few days before, in dissapprobation of the Union with Ireland) " This reasoning will enable Mr Fox to abandon all his " opposition doctrines, and we are happy to " see Mr. Fox have recourse to it, as it gives " assurance that he will not be the dangerous man in power it was apprehended, " that he will not advocate the plans of " Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, or promote the " designs of the Corresponding Society. " But this reasoning has not wholly removed the effects of his original imprudent " declaration. The meetings in Dublin have " indeed resolved not to press the repeal of " the Union immediately; but they have " appointed a permanent Committee to " maintain a correspondence throughout " Ireland with those who desire the repeal. " Mr. Fox's rash language has given birth " to an establishment of Corresponding Societies, the evil effects of which may one

" dly be severely felt. He seems fully a-
" ware of the mischief he has done, and
" has made a second declaration in Parlia-
" ment to counteract it. In the debate on
" India Affairs on Tuesday, alluding both to
" Ireland and India, " " He agreed we
" " were not now to revert to original the-
" " ories; but when we were examining
" " into the causes of important events
" " which were extremely complicated in
" " their nature, it was somewhat difficult
" " to do so without, in some measure, ad-
" " verting to such original theories. He,
" " however, did not mean to say that any
" " alteration ought at present to take place
" " in the general system of Indian Go-
" " vernment as now by law established.
" " He had occasion to state, at a former
" " time, that there was a wide difference
" " between disapproving of measures at
" " their commencement, and afterwards
" " rescinding them when they had
" " been some time in practice. This
" " he had said with regard to the Union
" " with Ireland He had strongly disap-
" " proved of that measure when it was
" " proposed, because he was then con-
" " vinced it was a bad one, and was still
" " convinced that it would have been
" " much better for the country if it had
" " never taken place. He had also disap-
" " proved of the plan for the government
" " of India; but what he had said with
" " regard to the Union with Ireland, he
" " now said respecting this plan of Indian
" " government. It was, in his opinion,
" " a bad one from the beginning; but as
" " it had been adopted and acted upon, it
" " was not now to be lightly rescinded.
" " In ninety-nine cases of this nature out
" " of a hundred, it was better to put up
" " with many inconveniencies arising from
" " the first adoption of a measure, than
" " hazard worse evils by premature and
" " ill-considered alterations and innova-
" " tions." "——The above declaration of
" Mr. Fox is of the highest importance; it
" cannot be too often read and considered
" by the country. It *is a general argument,*
" *applicable to any other measure or system*
" *of things as well as to the Union and the*
" *government of India.* On the same prin-
" ciples Mr. Fox *may renounce every opi-*
" *nion he has hitherto held, revoke every*
" *pledge he has hitherto given.* The public
" will perceive this with great satisfaction,
" and cherish the most flattering hopes. For
" this we are no doubt indebted to the in-
" fluence of Lord Grenville, who has also,
" we believe prevailed upon Mr. Fox to
" abandon all design of soliciting peace at a
" moment so inauspicious as the present.
" Under these circumstances we shall " hope
" for the best," without very minutely in-
" vestigating the minor appointments in the
" government."——As an enemy of the new ministry, and particularly of Mr. Fox and his friends, this writer has managed well his statement; has turned his materials to good account. But, his inferences are false. Not only are they false in fact; but, they do not fairly flow from the premises, which he himself has stated. The passage of Mr. Fox's speech, quoted by this writer, is, I must confess, more liable to misconstruction than I could have wished. As to the measure of the Union, it is one, which cannot now be undone without throwing the country into confusion. It is, in point of magnitude, somewhat approaching to a change of dynasty. But, because a measure like this cannot be undone; or, at least, because it cannot be undone without producing effects of almost a revolutionary cast; is this any reason why a change, yea, a complete change, should not take place as to the mode of governing and conducting the affairs of our colonies in the East-Indies; especially when we are now convinced, when the proof is before parliament itself, that the present mode is subversive of all the ends for which colonies ought to be held? Every man is now convinced, that the deplorable state of the East-Indies and the East-India Company's affairs, never forgetting the heavy taxes which have thereby been, and will again be, brought upon the nation; every man is now convinced, that all this has proceeded from the Pitt system of governing India: and, if we are to be told, that it is better for us still to put up with these mischiefs and calamities, " than to hazard worse " evils," when, and in what case are we, 'a God's name,' to hope for any benefit at all from the change which has taken place in the councils of his Majesty! That no " *pre-*
" *mature* and *ill-considered* alterations and " innovations" should take place, all men of sense will agree; and, it was only in the applying of the remark, relative to the Union, to the mode of governing India; it was only in making such an application of that remark as seemed to extend it to all cases whatsoever, and to shut the door against all change; it was in this only, that Mr. Fox furnished a handle for the sarcastic observations of his enemies, and that he excited alarm amongst his friends; alarm, however, which I am confident the result will prove to have been perfectly groundless. —Along with these professions of Mr. Fox, there, unfortunately comes, too, the awk-

ward step of General Fitzpatrick, the new Secretary at War, who, as we shall, upon a future occasion, more fully remind ourselves, took a very active part in the case of Colonel Johnstone; who gave a solemn notice of an intended motion upon the subject as soon as parliament should again meet; and who has now *withdrawn that notice* for a reason, which, in spite of the multitude of words, by which, like stinted fruit buried in a superabundance of leaves, it is sheltered, resolves itself, at last, into this, that the intended motion is not now proper, because the intended mover *is in place!* The motion was to stand upon the ground of an alledged injury, received by Colonel Johnstone. It would, doubtless, have had in contemplation the prevention of the future recurrence of such injuries to officers of the army; but, the first object of all was, or ought to have been, to obtain justice for the injured party. Has that been obtained? The new Secretary at War's speech says no such thing. Will it be obtained? The new Secretary at War makes no such promise. Indeed, he says nothing at all about it. He withdraws his support, his promised, his pledged, support, without letting fall a single word, that could induce any man, who has been an observer of similar scenes, to believe, that he had seriously in contemplation, either to obtain redress for the past, or to prevent similar injuries for the future.———This very unexpected step of the Secretary at War, joined to the professions of Mr. Fox with regard to India and the Union with Ireland, have, it must be acknowledged, produced a very considerable alarm amongst all those, who, in a change of ministry, anxiously looked for something very different indeed from a mere change of men, a mere transfer of emoluments; who looked, in short, for a complete *change of system*, as the only means of giving the country a chance of restoration.——— As to the professions, said to have been made by Mr. Fox to the Irish Roman Catholics, it must be observed, that that question does not stand upon the same ground whereon it stood last year. It, then, had never been submitted to parliament; now, it has been so submitted, and has been decided. The great alteration, indeed, which is made by the proposer of a measure moving from one side of the House across to the other (and which has been so fully manifested in this last instance) is not to be left out of the consideration; but, it appears to me, that a vast majority of the king's subjects are fully convinced, that, to grant what the Catholics now ask would be merely to invite them to ask more; that, in fact, if any thing be granted them, much more *ought* to be granted them; and, that, therefore, until you can settle upon some material alteration, some great and final change in their condition, the wise way is to let them remain as they are, taking care, however, to use every means in your power to render the administration of the government in Ireland as mild and beneficent towards them as possible; and, that such care will be taken, by the present ministry, every one, who has observed the new appointments to the affairs in that country, must, I think, be convinced.——— In remarking upon the recent professions of the ministers, I have in view to prevent misconstruction in others, rather than to criticise myself. The mind of the public is, at this moment, just in that state which exposes it to the receiving of an evil impression, and an impression, too, not easily to be removed. The expectations of the people were very great; for, though they did not hope for an immediate good effect from the change of councils, they expected an immediate indication of a wish, of an intention, and even of a resolution, on the part of the new ministers, to make such *alterations*, to introduce such a *change of system*, as would be an earnest of future good. This expectation has not, it must be avowed, been yet fulfilled; and, the state of the public mind, is, to give it the most favourable description, that of doubt, bordering rather upon disappointment as to the present, and of apprehension as to the future. Into the steps which have chiefly tended to produce this effect upon the public mind, Mr. Fox has evidently been led by that same influence, which during the last session of Parliament, occasioned those memorable declarations, which, in exculpation of Mr. Pitt, were made from the Opposition Benches. The concessions *then* made were very injurious to the cause of public justice, as well as to popular confidence in public men; for, there was not, in the whole kingdom, one single man of common sense, who did not perceive, that, as to the misapplication of the naval money, Mr. Pitt stood in exactly the same situation with Lord Melville; and, where was the man who did not perceive, that the distinction between the cases of the two consisted simply in this, that the former had friends amongst the Opposition, while amongst them the latter had none. To the same cause must be attributed the faint opposition that was made to the proposition for erecting a monument to Mr. Pitt; and, which is, after all, of still more importance, the ready acquiesence in the proposition for paying that

person's debts. How far this complaisance, this disposition to compromise, may be carried, I cannot pretend to foresee; but, I have little hesitation in saying, that, if it be carried much further, and, particularly, if, as in the instance of Mr. Francis's exclusion, it be suffered to chip away the great foundations, upon which the Fox party stand so completely committed; if this should be, I hesitate not to say, that the fame of a twenty years of opposition will be extinguished for ever by a twenty months, nay, by a twenty weeks, of official situation. Only a little more in the way of compromise, in the way of concession, in the way of retractation, express or tacit; only a very little more; only another step or two, and it will be too late to recoil. The thing will be done: the public mind will be decidedly made up: and to proceed, though shackled in every limb, and dragged along through mire and filth, will be just as safe and as pleasant as to retreat.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.——On Monday the 3d instant, a motion was made, in the House of Lords, by the Earl of Bristol, for passing a resolution, disapproving of the appointment of the Lord Chief Justice to a seat in the Cabinet. A similar motion was made in the House of Commons, by Mr. Spencer Stanhope. In the former the motion was negatived without a division: in the latter, there were for the motion, 64; against it, 222; a division which, (particularly when we consider who were the persons that voted on the side of the ministers, and how those same persons lately voted) has established, beyond all controversy, the fact, that arguments coming from the right-hand side of the House do produce greater effect than when they come from the left-hand side, whence Mr. Fox made his last speech upon a division question, and where he found himself left in a minority of 89 against 258?——After having duly attended to every part of this discussiou, as far as I have been able to attend to it, I remain confirmed in the opinion, which I before entertained and expressed, relative to this important subject. Lord Grenville is, in the newspapers, reported to have said, "that much pains had been taken, out of "the House, to *mislead* the public mind "upon the subject, and to impress a per-"suasion that the appointment was *illegal*." No: with all due deference to Lord Grenville; not so. I, for my part, observed no *pains* taken to mislead the public. I heard no insinuation, nor any high-swelling bombastical verbosity, intended to seduce or scare the poor public into an erroneous opinion as to the appointment of Lord Ellenborough, of whom besides, *personally*, not one single syllable had, from first to last, been uttered, except in commendation; commendation, too, which, perhaps, Lord Ellenborough might not be disposed to regard as the less valuable on account of its being founded on his well-known hostility to the corruptions of the Pitt system.——That the appointment in question was "ille-"gal" no one has ever asserted; but, as a correspondent (whom I thank for his hints) observes, that it was *unconstitutional*, in the fair sense of the word (if the word has any fair and fixed sense at all) nobody can, I think, deny. Lord Bristol, whose speech, not less admirable in manner than in matter, made a great impression upon the House, and has since made an impression equally great upon the country; this nobleman chose, in his proposed resolution, the word "in-"expedient," instead of "unconstitu-"tional," which was, I think it must be allowed, carrying forbearance to full as great a length as the case would justify.——The reader will have perceived, that the whole course of the speakers, who defended the appointment, was, to avoid all general reasoning on the impropriety of uniting the two characters of Judge and of Cabinet Minister; and to entrench themselves behind a long list of precedents from practice. Nor, must we here, except Mr. Fox, who, though his speech was a finished specimen of eloquence, and though he did most manfully lay down the doctrine of responsibility, was obliged to have recourse to precedents as the only ground, whereon to make even a shew of successful resistance. But, after all this, who was there, that must not have perceived, that, of all the instances, which were cited as examples, one only could be properly called a precedent, the rest being, at best, loose and distant analogies. Lord Mansfield's case was the only one which could strictly be called a precedent. He, being a common-law Judge, had a seat in the Cabinet, and did take an habitual part in advising the crown, on the ordinary affairs of state. Since the Revolution no other common-law Judge ever did; and, upon the propriety of taking precedents, with respect to Judges, from that period downwards, we may surely insist, because one of the great works of the Revolution was the act for making them independent of the crown. ——The nature of the other precedents it is truly curious to observe. The Chief Justice, say the defenders of the appointment, has almost always been named one of the members of the Council of Regency, in the

different Regency acts which have been passed since the Revolution. This had been alluded to in the speech of Lord Bristol, who had allowed, that a Judge of the courts of Common Law might, for extraordinary and special occasion, have had a species of political existence; but, the former position still remains, that, as to precedents, there is but one instance of a common-law Judge having become a member of the ordinary executive government. Observe, too, that, whether it be wise or unwise to make a Judge a member of the Regency Council, it is, at most, only on special emergencies that we can be exposed to the evil; and, when we are, the thing certainly loses a good deal of its mischievous quality, from its being *parliament*, and not the *crown*, that appoints the Council of Regency. The whole of the statement, wherein we are desired to look upon each member of the cabinet as being nothing more than a *privy councillor*, called to sit in a particular committee of the privy council, is, if not a quibble, certainly what one does usually denominate an argument; or, if we must dignify it with that name, we must, at the same time, be allowed to say, that it is wholly destitute of foundation; and we may be allowed to express our fears, that it is calculated to deceive and delude the people upon a subject, where, at some time or other, delusion may lead to most mischievous consequences. As a privy-councillor merely the member acquires no influence whatever in the determining upon measures of state, and, as to those measures, he contracts no responsibility. A member of the cabinet is one of the confidential advisers of the crown: call him by what name you please, he is substantially a *King's minister*, or *King's servant*; and, is it not notorious, that, so far from the cabinet being a selection of privy councillors, one half of the present ministers were called to the cabinet *first*, and, being already cabinet ministers, were, for that reason, made privy councillors.——This subject, having said no more upon it than what I regarded it my duty to say, and having had no intention whatever to mislead or inflame the people, but believing, that they do generally disapprove of the appointment, and that they may still disapprove of it, without discovering a disposition that would render them unworthy of a minister's endeavours to rescue them from destruction; this subject I will now dismiss in the words of the nobleman who began the debate in the House of Lords, and in whose sentiments I most heartily concur. "I may "be told, that these are cases" [cases wherein the Lord Chief Justice would have to decide upon the Bench, and in which he would be interested as a cabinet minister] "which "are not likely to occur, and that, under "such circumstances, the learned Judge "would abstain from attending the cabinet. "I desire no better proof of the incompa-"tibility of the two situations than this; "namely, that, in order to do his duty as "a man, he must desert his duty as a judge, "or as a minister. And I must observe be-"sides, that I desire a better security for "the persons and property of my country-"men than the discretion of any mortal "breathing."

Affairs of India. —— The motions, which are making, in the House of Commons, preparatory to a general discussion relative to the conduct of Lord Wellesley, bring out, ever and anon, some curious facts, acknowledgements, and assertions. Of these latter, the following from Mr. Hudleston, a Director, on Monday, the 3d instant, is worthy of particular notice. "That the *evils* which *now oppress* "the East-India Company, were not "imputable to the Court of Directors." These were his very words. Observe, then, 1. The distress is acknowledged; it is, at last, acknowledged. 2. To whom is this distress to be imputed? 3. Why have not the Directors represented their case, and their ruin, *in its progress*, at any time, to parliament? 4. Have they even petitioned the king in council as the law points out? If not, it follows, that, by *their own* acts or omissions, they have barred themselves from all title to relief from the public purse, even if it were *possible* for the public purse to relieve them.——But, surely, there is not, and never again will be found, a minister to propose and a parliament to sanction a levy of money upon the people of England for the purpose of paying the debts of this Company of East-India merchants, who, as a debt growing out of their charter, already owe to that people, that wronged people, several millions of money! Surely this never will again be witnessed in England! Much better; much more merciful; much more just; much more politic, for the parliament to levy upon the people money wherewith to discharge the debts of all the debtors in the King's Bench prison, and in all the prisons of the United Kingdom.—— Nay, frown not, thou Eastern Bashaw! what, in the name of justice and of reason, gave you a claim upon our benevolence stronger than that of our poor countrymen, who, perhaps, have been, many of them, forced into jail at the suit of the t xegatheren?

I am not questioning the propriety and the necessity of such suits; but, have not the sufferers as good a claim as you upon our purse?——More of this hereafter, when we come to examine Mr. Charles Grant's position, that England is "benefited by the "fortunes acquired in India and spent here:" more of this then; and, for the present, let us quit the subject with a remark or two upon the sort of assistance which MR. PAULL experiences in the obtaining of the documents necessary to his proposed inquiry. We before noticed the advice which had been kindly and gratuitously bestowed upon the honorable gentleman by Lord Morpeth and Mr. Hiley Addington, the two paid members of the Board of Control; and, the kindness of Lord Temple now appears not less evident, nor, indeed, less useful, than that of Mr. Hiley Addington; but, his lordship has the additional merit of being only a volunteer in the business.

THE PITT FACTION.——This description of persons are most egregiously deceived, if they suppose, that the people will ever look to them as AN OPPOSITION. All that they will have in view, will be to obtain "in-"demnity for the past and security for the "future;" and, if they succeed in this, they may be very well contented. The people, they may be assured, will never look for defenders of their rights amongst the defenders of Lord Melville; and, if the present ministers should act contrary to the principles, which they professed while out of office, a new race of men will arise, or, the whole scene will become too contemptible to be worthy of notice.

FATE OF THE FUNDS.

To the Right Hon. Charles James Fox.

SIR;—I perfectly concur in the opinion of Mr. Cobbett, that the National Debt is a subject, which, at this time, claims the most grave and serious consideration. If I am right, it yields to none in the mighty consequences it involves: and, I am free to own, as the result of the closest investigation and deepest reflection, which my mind is capable of, that I am profoundly penetrated with the truth of the observation; that "*the nation must destroy (reduce) the debt; or the debt will destroy the nation.*" Much as I am in the habit of deference to so high an authority as your judgment: much as I give you credit for every statesman-like qualification: and convinced as I am that you possess too much dignity of mind, to make any improper concessions, for the purpose of obtaining credit with the "blood-suckers" and "muck-worms" as one of the greatest men this country has produced, denominated the fund-dealers. I cannot, however, forbear expressing my uneasiness at, and total dissent from, the opinion attributed to you, in the newspaper reports of a speech of yours lately; in which you are made to say, that "*the sinking fund has done great good to the country.*" This, I would willingly hope, is a mis-statement. If, indeed, your observation had been confined to the support and approbation you had given to the measure, at the time it was introduced: if you did then, as I for one, certainly did, hope that it would prove adequate to its professed object; and that, consequently, without any thing like intolerable addition to our burthens, the country might, by peace and economy, rescue the succeeding generation from the evils we had brought upon ourselves, by an impolitic, wasteful, and ruinous war: there needs, so far, no apology either for Mr. Pitt, as the author, or yourself as the supporter of the sinking fund. But the subsequent war, (just or unjust, wise or unwise, is not now the question) has certainly been so expensive as to supersede, and render *totally abortive*, this scheme for the reduction or liquidation of the national debt. Before I proceed, I beg leave to disclaim the most distant intention of opposition to your administration. On the contrary, I hail it as most auspicious to the best interests of the British nation. If I have any political prejudices, they certainly all run in your favour. In short, I have been so long accustomed to entertain a most implicit confidence, both in your integrity and judgment; that, though myself unconnected with office, I now feel the extravagant pretension of being identified, in some sort, with the glory and success of your measures. If, therefore, I happen to differ from you, on what I deem a momentous question; I am very willing to allow, that, the only presumption of my being right, and you wrong, is, in its having engaged my most unremitting attention, while it has possibly employed only a small portion of yours. I am well informed from various persons, that the part of your speech, to which I have alluded, has produced a very strong sensation of applause in 'Change Alley: and this, permit me to say, is very cogent, and to me *alarming* evidence, that they expect from you the support of Mr. Pitt's system of finance. If such expectation should be founded, how deeply should I lament your elevation to power! For I would rather the nation should be trampled to death by any one than by my friend Mr. Fox. Though I must admit that assertion is not argument; I have a right to defy, and I do defy, any one

to prove, that with a peace establishment to-morrow, the present income of the country is adequate to the expenditure. I will go further, and insist, without fear of contradiction, that with the continuance of the war taxes, and allowing them, against all probability, to be as productive as they have hitherto been, the whole revenue would be short of the expenditure by 15 millions.—But, there is a most unaccountable delusion, which, strange as it may appear, has been by some means imbibed very generally among the superficial thinkers on this subject; unfortunately the great majority of the nation. I have collected from frequent conversation and otherwise, that it is very *pleasantly* imagined, that the increase of the debt, by loans, is confined to the principal *only*; while the sinking fund is to extinguish both principal and interest; and thus, if we invert the application of the metaphor of Thomas Payne, "the cow is to overtake the hare." This gross fallacy I do not mean to expose to your enlightened mind: but permit me, through the medium of this address, to say to those who are under the influence of so preposterous a notion, that the same rule, according to the unalterable nature of things, of compound interest, which operates in the redemption of the debt, by the sinking fund, must apply to the increase of debt by the annual loans. For the sake of elucidation let us suppose on a peace establishment the expenditure to be 50 millions, and the income 40 millions: is it not a self-evident proposition, that government must borrow, at 5 per centum, 10 millions and a half; and thereby create a new debt of half a million? And is it not equally incontestible, *cæteris paribus* that for the second year the sum of 11,025,000l. and for the third 11,576,250l. must be borrowed, and so progressively increase every year? I repeat that this sort of reasoning, against which may be justly urged the quotation, "in re non dubiâ, testibus non necessariis utitur," is not addressed to you: it would be little short of insult to a mind so comprehensive as yours, to insist upon such truisms. The inference then is, that, unless the patriotic gentlemen who have hitherto so kindly assisted in getting the nation deeper into debt, will lend their money, in future, without interest or bonus, which, I *rather* suspect is not the intention of this race of patriots, it only remains for the legislature to determine, whether it is wise to contend any longer with impossibilities; or whether it will at once adopt an effectual plan for the *reduction* of the debt, and the consequent diminution of the taxes. I have, so far, argued upon the hypothesis of the present revenue being maintained. In a second letter which I propose to have the honour of addressing to you, I shall endeavour to demonstrate that a great defalcation is not only inevitable, but that the present system of taxation is at mortal enmity with the industry, commerce, and manufactures of the country; and will, therefore, undermine and destroy, if not speedily put an end to, the very foundation of *permanent* revenue. Its other baneful effects, of a still *more dangerous* nature, I shall also make some observations upon.——I have the honour to be with the highest respect, &c. I. T.

London, February 8, 1806.

P. S. It will appear to any person who chooses to make the computation, and nothing can be more easy: that, supposing an annual deficiency of ten millions for 14 years, it would create, at interest of 5 per cent. upwards of 205 millions of debt. Now it is matter of notoriety, that capital invested for that period, will barely double itself, with compound interest. Admitting, therefore, the commissioners to have redeemed 140 millions of the national debt, they can only redeem about as much more within the time mentioned. I bar any quibbling of the small wits, about the appropriation of the annual million, and part of every loan, to the sinking fund; because my *supposed* deficiency of income, must be increased accordingly. The same may be said of an imaginary advantage the commissioners possess, by receiving the dividends quarterly or half yearly; for it is evident, the stock they buy up, must be dearer than if the interest were paid annually.

	£
Amount of deficiency of revenue to be borrowed - -	10,000,000
Interest on ditto	500,000
	10,500,000
2d year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	20,500,000
Interest	1,025,000
	21,525,000
3d year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	31,525,000
Interest	1,576,250
	33,101,250
4th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	43,101,250
Interest	2,155,062

	45,256,312
5th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	55,256,312
Interest	2,762,815
	58,019,127
6th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	68,019,127
Interest	3,400,956
	71,420,083
7th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	81,420,083
Interest	4,071,004
	85,491,087
8th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	95,491,087
Interest	4,774,553
	100,265,640
9th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	110,265,640
Interest	5,513,282
	115,778,922
10th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	125,778,922
Interest	6,288,946
	132,067,868
11th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	142,067,868
Interest	7,103,393
	149,171,261
12th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	159,171,261
Interest	7,958,563
	167,129,824
13th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	177,129,824
Interest	8,850,491
	185,986,315
14th year deficiency of revenue	10,000,000
	195,986,315
Interest	9,799,315
	205,785,630

CONSEQUENCES OF THE LATE CAMPAIGN.

Sir; Europe has received so severe a blow in the last campaign, that nothing but the folly of its antagonist or conducting its remaining resources with great wisdom, prudence, and foresight, can be expected soon to restore it. It is necessary to weigh well and in time what his next enterprizes may be, for, I do think that they must be "Nature's fools," not his, who can entertain an idea that he will remain satisfied not only with what he has acquired, but with what he is in a train of acquiring. He generally publishes his schemes with an ostentation that would be thought a design to mislead, if experience did not prove that it arose from the presumptuousness and insolence of success. There can be little doubt, that the first of his wishes is, to break the power of this country; and, it is not improbable, that to succeed more surely, to put an end to any coalition, and to be at liberty to prosecute other views with more freedom, he may propose peace: it would be the armistice of Austerlitz, or the peace of Presburgh: he there said to Austria, desert your allies, and I shall assist you in plundering them, to indemnify you for every thing but the loss of honour, independence, and the means of defence. The tattered rags of the self-named Roman purple submitted to be sullied by the compromise; it is hoped that England is not yet sunk so low as even to take it into consideration. If we had peace immediately, no man, who values the safety or independence of these islands, could lay his head down to rest in tranquillity, unless there was a fleet lying ready at a moment's warning to intercept his embarkations. If we had no allies, perhaps, even such an armed truce might be tried at the hazard of attempts upon our distant settlements; but while we have alliances, and at least as great as there could be any prospect of soon having again, it is not only most honourable, but likewise most prudent, to contribute as far as is in our power to assist their efforts or their defence against the common enemy. —From the time of his first campaign, Buonaparté seems to have directed his attentions to the East; the expedition to Egypt is said to have been his own choice. He is himself formed more on the manners of the eastern than the western nations. Instead of laying the foundation of solid power, with the simplicity of Augustus, he has taken the pompous despotism of Diocletian or Constantine for his model; he has even introduced the offices and the very names of the pageantry of the lower empire; his inflated reports, his bombastic expressions, his spending enormous sums in gaudy shew while his soldiers are

often in want of pay, and the ridiculous distinctions he has bestowed on the members of his own family, are all in the same stile. His character is that of the same age. Let not the unthinking suppose that like Alexander he would gild the disgrace of conquest by the grandeur of his views, or the grovelling expect, that, like Trajan, he would soften subjection by the benignity of his government. His desire of power is not that of pre-eminence among men, it is that of despotism among slaves; even his brother, to whose eloquence, conduct, and firmness, while he himself had lost his presence of mind, the success of the 18th Brumaire is said to be due, has been sent into exile, because he would not descend to all the servility he required. In him no trace of the hero is to be found, magnanimity kindles at a kindred spark, he extinguishes it, and it is said with a sarcastic smile, as if it was what he envied and detested. Ability, bravery, and fidelity have long been a claim in Europe to those who, by the fortune of war, have fallen into the hands of an enemy; he treats the meritorious with barbarity, while the incapable, the traitor, and the coward, he receives with distinction. In no part of Europe, except in his dungeons, are prisoners ever suspected of suffering an unfair death. Many anecdotes are before the public, that shew his character in a strong light. If the circumstances related of the death of the Duke d'Enghien are true, although from the violence of the deed, they have almost escaped attention, they mark his disposition in characters not to be mistaken: Nero or Caligula might have ordered him to be killed on the spot. Aurelian might have immolated him in his camp, but to drag him some hundred miles, to force him to a mock trial without rest, to refuse his simple dying requests, to order him to immediate execution, and coolly and calmly to receive petitions in his favour for several days after he was put to death, belongs to more degenerate times than even those he has taken for his model, and can only be found in the last ages of the lower empire. He has a passion for military fame and for conquest, so had Genghis and Tamerlane, and from the still greater weakness of their enemies their conquests were still greater and more rapid than his. Though, by his victories he contributed to the aggrandizement of France, he was not the founder, nor even the restorer of French greatness; when it was restored, he sent the man who restored it to retirement; he only makes use of the weapons that were forged by another, and I believe it is certain that they have not been improved in his hands. He is fortunately more intent on the splendid than the solid; he has already, in one of his demi-official bravados, told us that he is to march to the Ganges, and, his dispositions and motions shew an inclination, in addition to the crowns of Charlemagne and Theodoric, to join that of Arcadius by the way. The great force he is marching into Italy, and his farther reinforcing the army of Massena, almost prove to what he points, so positively insisting on the cession of Istria and Dalmatia, particularly specifying the islands of the Adriatic, and, above all, so carefully including the mouths of the Cataro, give strong reason to suspect that he intends to seize Albania, which has never been thoroughly subjected to the Turkish empire, and march an army into the east to the south of Mount Hæmus. If it should be confirmed that he is endeavouring to arm another fleet for the Mediterranean, it is likewise to be presumed, that he means to transport that army across the Adriatic; indeed, the communication by Istria and Dalmatia would be so circuitous and difficult that it would be almost impossible to convey regular supplies by that route, except such as he compelled Austria to furnish. It is not improbable, that the combined fleet, before the battle of Trafalgar, was destined for that purpose, upon a presumption of the success that has since attended him, and, it would not exceed the presumption he has shewn on former occasions, if he had, already, dispatched a squadron to the East, to co-operate with that beyond the Hellespont. Whether he will abandon the Turkish provinces to the north of Mount Hæmus to the Austrians alone, remains yet to be seen; if he should, there can be litle doubt that it must be for the purpose of drawing upon them the vengeance of Russia, and, by that means, allow him to pursue his principal object in that quarter without opposition. If that is his scheme, or, even, if he should send an auxiliary army to assist or rather to dictate to them, it is to be hoped that Russia will not be duped by that artifice, but will direct and concentrate her whole force against the progress of the French. Austria is now so humbled, that any acquisition there, can be no object of jealousy; when French influence and French support are at an end, that power can easily be reduced within narrower limits. —If such should be his plan, there is an essential part reserved for Great-Britain to act in frustrating his schemes of ambition. The safety of this country is the first and primary object, to which every other ought to be subordinate; but, after fulfilling that

purpose, we ought to have a naval force competent to execute the other. To indifferent seamen, like the Turks and Russians, a trifling squadron of British vessels is probably necessary, as instructors, but their navies ought to be fully equal to preventing any embarkation of his from crossing the Adriatic, unless he can procure a naval force from the west of Europe, to oppose which is a charge that must fall upon England, and would require that we should preserve a decided superiority in the Mediterranean. Buonaparté's anxiety to get possession of Malta is, perhaps, now explained, and, the great value of it in our hands, not only to this country but to Europe, is now seen; for, supposing an enemy's fleet to have eluded ours, and stood up the Mediterranean, if a proper number of light cruizers are kept on the look out from that island, it is hardly possible, by our fleet running immediately for Malta, that they should not get certain intelligence of their course, and avoid a repetition of the escape they made from Lord Nelson on their expedition to Egypt. This is the principal part that Great-Britain could act on that occasion, but such an expedition opens a vast field for speculation in which though not immediately, we are ultimately concerned.—The political and military causes of the aggrandisement of France, require a connected induction, and, I do not mean even to touch upon them at present, but so much is to be learned for the future from the last campaign, that it cannot be passed over entirely, without observation. Since the end of the seventeenth century, when great armies began to be brought into action, experience has shewn that Austria, especially in a defensive war, should never have met the French armies in the field, till they had buried themselves in the heart of Germany; when the Austrians have been defeated on the frontiers, it has generally been decisive of the campaign, and, sometimes of the war. In the war of 1742 the French army which entered Germany under the most favourable circumstances, was ruined in Austria and Bohemia; it was the same in the first irruption of Jourdan and Moreau; in the war of the Spanish succession, the Austrians were defeated by Tallard, near Spires, and the Duke of Marlborough was obliged to march from the Netherlands to retrieve their affairs at Blenheim; in the campaign that preceded the peace of Luneville, the Austrian army received a blow near the sources of the Danube, which they never recovered. If Ulm, however, had been an inattainable position, with full magazines, and the French army had not so far outnumbered them as to bear to be divided, the Austrians might have maintained that position, and would, almost certainly, have stopped their progress, for, while their communications and supplies could have been cut off on one side, by detachments pushed into Franconia, which had a secure retreat, and their rear harrassed and infested from the Tyrol on the other, the French never could have dared to advance beyond it. The King of Prussia, in his intrenched camp near Scheiridnitz, covered Silesia against the whole force of the Austrians and an auxiliary army of Russians. It was evident that General Mack expected the French by the Forest Towns, as General Moreau had penetrated before when they had a large army in Switzerland; and some trifling demonstrations that Buonaparte made there, seem completely to have deceived him. But it cannot be conceived that he had not taken care to have information both of the very superior strength of the French army, and of the actual line of their march, in time to have changed his plan; against the former, he must have known that his position was untenable, and as to the latter, instead of losing his army, he might have given the French at least a check. If he had immediately descended the Danube, he had an opportunity of attacking their divisions single as they passed it with his whole army. It was thus that Buonaparté himself ruined the army that was sent to the relief of Mantua, as the divisions entered Italy; and it was by disregarding the intelligence that was sent him, and wandering away to Genoa, instead of attacking the different divisions of the French army that crossed the Alps, immediately on their issuing from the mountains, that Gen. Melas did not prevent the battle of Marengo, save Italy, and indeed the house of Austria. Had General Mack thus brought his own army safe to the Inn, or perhaps the Enns, been reinforced by the corps there and the first Russian army; while the French would have been weakened, not only by the losses they might have sustained, but by the numerous detachments they must have left, what might have been now the situation of Buonaparte? he might have shared the same fate with Moreau, who, I believe, was at least his equal in military talents, have collected the remains of his army on the Rhine. Let the fate of the Austrians likewise be a warning, never to trust an army to a nominal commander with a preceptor. The destruction of that army would hardly have been so complete, if a difference of opinion

had not arisen between the Archduke and his preceptor, which kept them undecided and motionless, when their fate depended upon promptitude and vigour of action. If I do not mistake, General Mack owed his rise to having the address at court to get the success of the allied armies on the frontiers of Poland placed chiefly to his account. In an evil hour, when the general in the Netherlands had given offence at Vienna, by acting too wisely, did the Emperor take the command there, that General Mack might command in his name; the disasters that followed are well known. Again, I think, for I speak from memory, he consented to let another prince, the Archduke John, receive the glory of his exploits, while he was satisfied to enjoy it only by reflection. The attack upon General Moreau, who had posted himself behind defiles, terminated in that part of the army which came into action being cut to pieces; for, as in the Netherlands, a part of it never reached the enemy. Not satisfied with these trials of his skill, he was still sent to crown the Archduke Ferdinand with laurels. For the loss of that army which was the hope of the House of Austria, and almost of Europe, he has been arrested as a traitor. It is an instructive lesson, both to those who are willing to become tools, and to those who are willing to employ them. We read of a Belisarius, but it is at least rare that merit is to be found the inmate of servility. The accounts of the battle of Austerlitz are so many and so various, that it is difficult to hazard a conjecture respecting it; but, from the official reports, it is evident, that from Buonaparté's retreating to take possession of that ground, he had chosen it for the field of battle, it then became the business of the allies, as they were determined to give battle, to compel him, if possible, to fight upon other ground. There may be sound reasons, but they do not appear on the face of the reports, why they did not march directly upon Nicolsburg, with so superior a force as to cut off the division there, before it could be reinforced, which would probably have rendered it necessary for Buonaparte to have changed his position, to open his communication with the Danube. If he had still advanced, Olmutz was not a place to be taken without a regular siege; and, as to farther reinforcements, they had already determined to come to action without them. It seems likewise clear, that Buonaparté's right was either not supported, or was at least attackable; and they appear to have failed in their attack from having clearly discovered their object by their motions the day before, and by having conducted that attack upon the supposition that his disposition was not to be changed in the night; whereas, as might have been expected, he had strengthened and extended his right by Davonst's division, which they unexpectedly encountered on their march to gain his flank. Had King William passed the Ghate in the night, after the approach of the first division of the French army, to the ground on which Dumourier attacked the Austrians, all the skilful manœuvres of the Duke of Luxemburg would have been ineffectual to bring on the battle of Neerwinden. After all, the battle of Austerlitz seems to have been only a repulse, and it is highly probable that Buonaparté had not made up his exaggerated report of it till after his conference with the Emperor of Germany, and that the armistice of Austerlitz, and the peace of Presburg were less the consequences of that battle, than of insidious proposals from him; this jesuitical minister which had been better received in that quarter than by the Emperor of Russia.—If Buonaparté should undertake such an eastern expedition, would his first step be to overwhelm the Russians in Corfu, with an immense force: to advance far into the Turkish provinces, while they were there would require two armies, one for that purpose, and another to be left on the Adriatic to cover his rear; they have there the same check upon him that General Mack would have had in an impregnable camp at Ulm, which from the insular situation, theirs is as long as the sea is well guarded. Will he trust to the half desert provinces of Turkey for subsistence? how an hundred and eighty thousand men were subsisted without magazines, is not easily accounted for, even if they have spread famine and desolation wherever they have been. Turenne whose whole army did not much exceed one of their divisions, had the plan of one of his campaigns entirely disconcerted by a connivance of the Bishop of Wurtzburg, where his bread was baked with the Imperialists. No resistance is to be expected from the Turkish troops; if left to themselves, their only means of defence is to lay the whole country waste before him. No effectual opposition can be expected except from Russia. Should the expedition be detained till a Russian army could be brought to their assistance, would it not still be wise to allow him to plunge himself deep into the Turkish provinces before they met him in the field? Would the Russian army at Corfou, be reinforced so as to take the field in his rear, or would a Russian army be

transported to Macedonia or Romania? Is there any strong position to cover Constantinople without hazarding the fate of a battle, or would the Russians not meet him, till he crossed the Bosphorus? Should he reach Constantinople, would the Turkish government remove to Asia, or would they rather descend into one of his federative kingdoms? If the latter, let it be remembered, that shattered as the Turkish empire is, it still extends to the Tigris, and we may then be able to form some conjecture how he cast his eyes on the Ganges from the banks of the Danube: but, in considering the consequences of such an event, it is necessary to withdraw our attention for a moment from the more important affairs of Europe, to the glittering scenes of Asia. Such wild projects may hasten the crash of his brittle empire, but their effects may be felt to the extremities of the globe.

CAMILLUS.

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO DRAW UP ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST HENRY LORD VISCOUNT MELVILLE. PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 4TH MARCH, 1806.

The Committee appointed to draw up Articles of Impeachment against Henry Lord Visc. Melville; and who were empowered to report such further Matters as shall have come to their Knowledge in the course of the Examinations taken before them, with respect to the Conduct of the said Lord Visc. Melville, during the time that he held the Office of Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy; Have agreed to the following REPORT.

Your committee have already reported to the House several Articles of Impeachment against Henry Lord Visc. Melville, which they considered it their duty to prepare without delay, upon the circumstances and transactions disclosed in the reports referred to them.—They have since applied themselves to the further investigation of the matters contained in those reports, and having obtained much new and material information which in the judgment of your committee will make it necessary to prefer an additional article or additional articles of impeachment against Lord Melville, they think it their duty previously to submit the same to the consideration of the House.—The attention of your committee has been particularly directed to a sum of £10,000 in which Lord Melville stated himself to be indebted to the Navy Pay Office, when Mr. Trotter was first appointed Paymaster in Jan. 1786. How, when, and for what purposes this sum of £10,000 originally came into the possession of Lord Melville, is left by the reports referred to your committee wholly uncertain. It was manifest that it must have been received by Lord Melville, prior to the appointment of Mr. Trotter; and as the former paymaster (the late Mr. Andrew Douglas) executed that office during the whole of Lord Melville's first Treasurership, and so much of the second as preceded Mr. Trotter's appointment; your committee thought it expedient to call for and inspect all such books, papers, and accounts, of the late Mr. Douglas, relating to the Navy Pay Office, as could be produced to them. Many of these were found in the possession of his widow, and the examination of them has, in the estimation of your committee, brought to light very important matter; the truth of which is confirmed by information derived from other sources.—It is already known to the House that Lord Melville was first appointed Treasurer of the Navy on the 19th of Aug. 1782, and that by a warrant dated the 23d of Oct. 1782, his salary was increased to the net sum of £4,000, "in full "of all wages and fees, and other profits and "emoluments theretofore enjoyed by other "Treasurers of the Navy."—It now appears that Lord Melville on the 20th of Aug. 1782, (the day after he first entered upon his office) constituted Mr. Andrew Douglas his paymaster; and that on the same day Mr. Douglas paid to the account of Lord Melville at his bankers, Messrs. Drummonds, the sum of 1,000l. But as this advance seems to have been made to Lord Melville from the private funds of Mr. Douglas, it is here noticed by your committee only to explain in part the subsequent transactions.——Your committee find, that until the 6th of Nov. 1782, all the money issued from the Exchequer to the Treasurer of the Navy for naval services, was regularly paid upon his account as Treasurer of the Navy to the Bank of England, whose clerks appear to have attended at the Exchequer to receive it. On the 6th of Nov. 1782, this course of proceeding seems to have been, for the first time, departed from, there having been on that day 45,000l. issued from the Exchequer to the Treasurer of the Navy for naval services, of which sum only 40,000l. was paid to his account at the Bank, the remaining 5,000l. being, by the treasurer's order, deposited by the paymaster in an iron chest, then kept in the office cash-room, and called by him the Treasurer's Iron Chest.——On the 22d of the same month the sum of 50,000l. was issued from the Exchequer to the Treasurer of the Navy; of which only 47,000l. was

paid to his account at the Bank, the remaining 3,000l. being placed as before in the iron chest.—On the 19th of Dec. 1782, a further issue of 93,830l. 6s. 10d. was made from the Exchequer to the Treasurer of the Navy; of which only 90,830l. 6s. 10d. was paid to his account at the Bank, the remaining 3,000l. being in like manner taken to the iron chest.—On the 2d of Jan. 1783, there was deposited in the iron chest the further sum of 5,000l. which was that day received from the then Mr. Welbore Ellis's ex-treasurership, in repayment of an advance to that amount which had been made to that ex-treasurership from Lord Melville's account at the Bank, in compliance with a minute of the Navy Board of the 30th of Nov. 1782.—The payments made into this iron chest on or before the 2d of Jan. 1783, stand therefore as follows; viz.

1782. Nov. 6.	From the Exchequ.	£ 5,000
22.	From Do. - -	3,000
Dec. 19.	From Do. - -	3,000
1783. Jan. 2.	From Mr. Ellis's Treasurership -	5,000
Making in the whole -		£16,000

How this sum of 16,000l. so issued to the Treasurer of the Navy for naval services, and by his order placed in his iron chest instead of being lodged in the Bank, was, in the first instance, disposed of, is fully explained by the accounts and papers of Mr. Douglas.—By these it will appear, that on the 11th of Nov. 1782, five days after the first deposit in the iron chest, Mr. Douglas the Paymaster, delivered to Lord Melville, upon his receipt, 500l. and on the following day 2,000l. more. On the 22d of the same month 1,000l. more was in like manner delivered by him to Lord Melville, and on the 25th the further sum of 3,000l.—On the 19th of Dec. following, the additional sums of 1,000l. and of 3,000l. were also delivered by the paymaster, to or for the use of Lord Melville, upon his receipt; making, with the former sums, 10,500l.; respecting the particulars of which, Mr. Douglas appears to have at this time made a statement to, and come to a settlement upon, with Lord Melville.—On the 4th of Jan. 1783 there remained in the iron chest 5,500l.; from which the sum of 3 000l. was on that day taken and paid to Mr. Jellicoe (then deputy paymaster) towards his office payments, leaving in the chest a residue of only 2,500l.; the whole of which residue was, on the 5th of April, 1783, delivered by Mr. Douglas to Lord Melville, upon his receipt.—Of the 16,000l. that was so deposited in the iron chest, it appears therefore that only 3,000l. was afterwards paid out for naval services to sub-accountants, the remaining 13,000l. having been paid to Lord Melville, upon his receipt, as under; viz.

1782. Nov. 11.	From the chest to Lord Melville -	500
12.	Do. - - -	2,000
22.	Do. - - -	1,000
25.	Do. - - -	3,000
Dec. 19.	Do. - - -	1,000
—	Do. - - -	3,000
1783. Apr. 5.	Do. - - -	2,500
Making in the whole		£13,000

In which sum of 13,000l. Lord Melville thus stood indebted to the public on the 5th of April, 1783.—On the 10th of that month Lord Melville resigned his situation of Treasurer of the Navy, without having discharged any part of that debt, and leaving the balance of his treasurer's account at the Bank deficient to the amount of the aforesaid sum of 13,000l.—On the 14th of April, 1783, four days after his resignation, this deficiency was further increased by a draft drawn on that day by Mr. Douglas, upon the then ex-treasurership account at the Bank, for 10,000l. which, though made payable to Mr. Jellicoe or bearer, was not, as it appears, delivered to Mr. Jellicoe, but was paid to Lord Melville, upon his receipt; making the deficiency in his ex-treasurership account at the Bank, or, in other words, his debt to the public amount to 23,000l.—And accordingly it is found, at the end of the same month, viz. 30th April, 1783, the office balance against Lord Melville was £89,408 12 3 and the Bank balance in his favour only - - 66,408 12 3

being deficient by - - 23,000 0 0

The whole of this 23,000l. appears to have remained due from Lord Melville until the 24th of June, 1783, when the reduction of it was begun by a payment of 1,000l. made by Mr. A. Gray (a clerk in the Navy Pay Office) to Lord Melville's ex-treasurership account, at the Bank.——Between that time and the 31st of July, 1783 several similar payments were made by Mr. Gray, and by a commercial house then trading under the firm of Mure and Atkinson, amounting in the whole to 15,400l. and reducing the debt of Lord Melville from 23,000l. to 7,600l.—The dates and sums of these payments will be seen in the following account:

Dr. - - Lord Melville - - Cr.

1783:	£.	1783:	£.
April 14. To Bank Balance	23,000	June 24. By Gray	1,000
		July 7. By Atkinson . .	5,000
		11. By Gray	1,400
		12. By Atkinson . .	6,000
		31. By Do. .	2,000
			15,400
		By Balance .	7,600
	23,000		23,000

From the 31st July, 1783, until after Lord Melville's re-appointment to the office in Jan. 1784, he remained indebted to the account of his ex-treasurership at the Bank in the above sum of 7,600l. and no reduction of it took place until the 13th of March, 1784, when a sum of 2,000l. was drawn out from his then second treasurership account at the Bank, and placed to his credit there in the account of his first or ex-treasurership. On the 24th of April, 1784, the sum of 1,000l. on the 17th of June, 1784, the sum of 1,500l; and on the first of March 1785 another sum of 1,500l. were in like manner transferred at the Bank from the account of the second to that of the first treasurership of Lord Melville, making in the whole 6,000l; and reducing the deficiency in the Bank balance of his first treasurership to the sum of 1,600l. but at the same time creating one of 6,000l. in the Bank balance of his second treasurership; so that the gross amount of the public money withheld by Lord Melville from the Bank, in this respect, still remained the same; viz. 7,600l.——It appears, however, that in the mean time, on the 20th of Aug. 1784, Mr. Douglas, the paymaster, drew from the account of the second treasurership at the Bank the sum of 2,000l. for the use of Lord Melville; and on the 25th of May, 1785, a similar transaction took place to the same amount; by which means Lord Melville became on that day indebted to the account of his second treasurership at the Bank as well in the sum of 6,000l. before stated to have been transferred from it to the account of the first treasurership, as in the sum of 4,000 drawn from it for private use, making together the the sum of 10,000l.——The whole of this sum of 10,000l. and also the sum of 1,600l. due to the account of the first treasurership, continued unpaid by Lord Melville until the 6th of Oct. 1785, when the 10,000l. deficiency was reduced to 9,000l. by a payment of 1,000l. (then due to Lord Melville for a quarter's salary) being made to the account of the second treasurership at the Bank. From that time until after the death of Mr. Douglas, in Dec. 1785, and the appointment of Mr. Trotter to succeed him in Jan. 1786, the deficiency continued unaltered, and there was due from Lord Melville to the public 1,600l. in respect of his first or ex-treasurership, and 9,000l. in respect of his second treasurership, making together the sum of 10,600l. Upon this statement it is evident that Lord Melville had in his hands, when Mr. Trotter was appointed Paymaster, 10,600l. of the public money, which had been withdrawn from the Bank; and that the sum of 10,000l. which Lord Melville told Mr. Trotter was due from him to the account of the second treasurership, was not a debt arising from any specific sum taken from that or the former treasurership, but was, with the addition of 600l. the undischarged residue of 27,000l. taken by him at several times from the public money; 23,000l. of it being originally taken from the issues to the first treasurership, and the remaining 4,000l. being taken from those made to the second.——At what times, and under what circumstances, the sums composing this 27,000l. originally came into the possession of Lord Melville, your committee have thus been able to ascertain. For what further purposes they were withdrawn, and what uses Lord Melville afterwards made of them, they cannot in every particular at present fully state to the House. But a part is found to have been paid to Lord Melville's private account at his bankers, Messrs. Drummonds, and 1,000l. to have been applied on the 19th of Dec. 1782, in repayment of the sum before stated to have been advanced to his lordship by Mr. Douglas the day after his first appointment to the office. Other sums appear to have formed items of account between Lord Melville and Mr. Gray, who, as already observed, was a clerk in the Navy Pay Office, and was, as your committee are informed, in the frequent habit of making pecuniary advances to Lord Melville.—The application of the large sum of 10,000l. which was withdrawn on the 14th of April, 1783, by a draft in favour of Mr. Jellicoe, your committee have been able to trace; and it appears to have been used by Lord Melville as a loan to the House of Muir and Atkinson, with whom he kept an account, and who appear to have been at that time in need of assistance. This advance will be found to have been more than discharged before the end of three months, by the repayments made by that house on the 7th and 12th July, 1783, to Lord Melville's ex-treasurership account at the Bank.—The use made of some of the smaller sums withdrawn, your committee have not yet disco-

vered; but being strongly impressed with the importance of the facts now laid before the House, and apprehensive that the articles of impeachment, which were prepared before they were in possession of this information, are not so framed as to admit full evidence of all the circumstances herein detailed, they have endeavoured to discharge their duty by stating them to the House as the ground of a further article to be added to those already preferred.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.—*Copy of an Account taken from a Book belonging to the late Andrew Douglas, Esq. Paymaster of the Navy during the 1st Treasurership of Lord Viscount Melville; and from the commencement of his second Treasurership to Mr. Douglas's decease in Dec. 1785.*

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas, Lord Advocate, Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy. His account with And. Douglas.

1782.				
Aug. 10.	To cash paid Messrs. R. and H. Drummond, and Co. per Receipt - - -	1,000	0	0
Sep. 23.	To Sol. Dyson's disbursements on the patent and entry at 5 offices, per acco.	123	3	3
Nov. 6.	Fees, &c. on the King's Warrant for treasurer's salary to be made up nett 4,000l. a year	10	11	0
	Entry of ditto at the 2 auditors of accounts and at the Navy Office, one guinea each	5	5	0
Sep. 10.	Entry of letter of attorney at the Exch., the Pells, and the Treasury - - -	2	12	6
Nov. 22.	2 warrants for 2 does at half a guinea each	1	1	0
		1142	12	9
Dec. 19.	Received pr. my rect. in consequence of his lordship rect. out of the office iron chest	1000	0	0
	Remains pr. accot. delivered	142	12	9

No. 2.—*Copy of another Account from the same Book.*

Rt. Hon. H. Dundas, Treasurer of the Navy, his iron chest in the office cash-room.

Nov. 6.	Lodged in the iron chest by the treasurer's order, part of this day's receipt in the Exchequer for the use of the navy - -		5000	0 0
Nov. 11.	Delivered to the tr. pr. his receipt	500	0 0	
12.	Delivered to the tr. pr. his receipt -	2000	0 0	
			2500	0 0
	Remain		2500	0 0
22.	Delivered to the treasurer per his receipt -		1000	0 0
			1500	0 0
25.	Lodged in the iron chest by the treasurer's order, part of this day's receipt for the use of the navy at the Exch.		3000	0 0
			4500	0 0
25.	Delivered to the treasurer per his receipt		3000	0 0
			1500	0 0
Dec 19.	Delivered to the treasurer per his receipt		1000	0 0
			500	0 0
	Lodged in the iron chest, part of this day's receipt at the Exchequer for the navy - -		3000	0 0
			3500	0 0
	Delivered to the treasurer per his receipt -		3000	0 0
20.	The above state was this day delivered, signed to the treasurer, the remaining balance agreed in - - -		500	0 0
1783.				
Jan. 2.	Lodged in the iron chest, received from trshp of Mr. Ellis, for like sum transferred at Plymth		5000	0 0
			5500	0 0
4.	Delivered to Mr. Jellicoe towards his office payments, per his receipt - -		3000	0 0
Apr. 5.	Delivered to the treasurer this remainder of per receipt - -		2500	0 0

5. Total as above delivered to the treasurer -	13000	0	0
14. Draft on the Bank to A. Jellicoe, Esq. and paid to the treasurer, per receipt - -	10000	0	0
Total borrowed from office cash	23000	0	0
June 24. Paid back by Mr. Grey -	1000	0	0
July 7. Paid back by Mr. Atkinson	5000	0	0
11. Paid back by Mr. Grey -	1400	0	0
12. Paid back by Mr. Atkinson	6000	0	0
31. Paid back by Mr. Atkinson	2000	0	0
	15400	0	0
Remains	7600	0	0

No. 3.—*Copy of another Account from the same Book.*

Abstract State, &c.

1783. April 14. Borrowed per accot. of this date - - - - - - - - - -	23000	0	0
Of which, Repayments made to the Bank; viz.			
1783. June 24. By Mr. Grey	1000	0	0
July 7. By Mr. Atkinson -	5000	0	0
12. By Mr. Grey	1400	0	0
. . By Mr. Atkinson -	6000	0	0
31. By Mr. Atkinson -	2000	0	0
	15400	0	0
1784. June 30. Unpaid remainder -	7600	0	0
Unpaid remainder as above	7600	0	0
In Bank, per bank book this day Agreed 1st treasurership -	8	12	3
2d treasurership -	21843	7	5
	£.29451	19	8

Balance per office cash book this day agreed 1784.

June 30. 1st treasurership -	3108	12	3
2d treasurership -	26343	7	5
	29451	19	8

No. 4, 5, and 6. *Statements of the Monthly Balances remaining in the Hands of Lord Melville as Treasurer of the Navy, and accounting for the Deficiencies in the Cash at the Bank, and were found amongst Mr. Douglas's Papers.*

No. 4.—*State of the Balances in the Bank, in the second Treasurership of the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, June 30, 1784.*

Paymaster's branch - - - -	4281	0	0
Cashier's do. - - - -	13414	0	9
Victualling do. - - - -	8648	6	8
	26343	7	5
Cash in Bank - -	21843	7	5
Transferred at sundry times to 1st trshp. - -	4500	0	0
£	26343	7	5

[*To be continued.*]

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